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Abstract. The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) has been extremely
discussed in the literature and it is useful to a number of real-world
applications. We propose a generalized version of the SMP in which
numbers of the matching groups are different as in [9]. However, we
go further to make a percentage of each group behave as active message
senders. As such, the special case in which all Males are active messengers
(beta = 1) and all Females are not active (alpha = 0) replicates the
results in [9]. Moreover, we use numerical simulation to present three
cases (and their extremes) in which we vary the percentage of active
messengers in each group. Whereas we are able to replicate previous
work, our numerical simulations also suggest that socially optimal comes
only when the groups are homogeneous. More real-world like results are
presented when members from both groups are active message senders.
Keywords: Stable Marriage Problem, Heterogeneity, Model General-
ization
1 Introduction
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) proposed by Gale and Shapley [3] matches
members from two distinct groups - usually Males and Females - in which, each
member of each group has all the members of the other group ranked ordinarily
in degree of preference. Members of one group (Males) are active when sending
messages (with proposals) to members of the other group (Females). Although
not having actually initiated the contact, the receiving end (Females) always
compares with current partner (if any) ranking and always chooses the highest
ranked bid, discarding previous match if necessary. The problem has been shown
to have a stable solution [9,7,1].
Since the SMP proposal, the algorithm has been debated, extended and dis-
cussed in the literature [7,8]. Recently, SMP has been applied to new economics
transport apps [6], to device communication and the internet [10,4] and actual
partner matching problems within internet apps [5].
Most of the literature, however, focuses on SMP with both groups of members
being of equal size. Shi et al. [9] just recently proposed a generalization in which
the number of the receiving agents (Females) are varied - from nearly none to
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double the size of the number of members on the other group (Males), advancing
on previous unequal group-sized work [2]. Shi et al. shows that the stable solution
is very sensitive to the number of agents and happiness of members from each
group change dramatically when departing from their equal numbers. Thus,
suggesting the instability of the SMP.
We propose to further generalize the SMP problem in which we have varying
sizes of one of the groups (Females) and thus the Instability in the SMP, namely
ISMP. We go further to propose that not only members of one group may be
active and send messages, but a varying percentage of each group and their
combinations can act as the active end as well.
Our results replicate previous work [9] and suggest that the stability is very
attached to the full membership of all members to a choice of being active or
passive (in its entirety). Small deviations, such as a .1 percent of members from
the Female group becoming active message senders changes the equilibrium. In
most cases, these new results are less socially optimal than the homogeneous
ones.
Besides this short introduction, we present the method, the results of the
numerical simulation of the three cases. We conclude with discussions.
2 Methods
Initially, we follow the traditional procedures summarized in [9].
1. N Male and M Female seek to match with a partner.
2. Each individual has a personal, random ranking of preference, ordering all
members of the opposite group.
3. Energy, or satisfaction, of each member is equivalent to the position of their
partner in their own ranking. Note, the highest the ranking, the lower is the
energy. Thus, the lowest energy is preferable.
4. Singles’ energy is given by the length of the opposite group, plus one, fol-
lowing [9].
5. The strong condition to solve the algorithm is that each run in the simulation
only finishes when all active messengers have sent messages to all possible
recipients. Thus, it is guaranteed that every single active messenger has been
rejected by all available recipients of the other group.
6. The recipient members always change partner for the better when receiving
proposals.
As it is shown in the description above, we have changed members of a given
group (Males or Females) into active (or not members). In order to implement
that, the procedures are as follows:
1. We introduce two parameters which are the probabilistic percentage of active
members in that group. Hence, the replication of the previous procedure
would have α = 0 for no active Female members and β = 1 for all Male
members to be active message senders.
2. Further, instead of having all Male members been rejected before the itera-
tion, we apply the strong condition that all active members who remain
single have been rejected by all members of the opposite group.
Those procedures guarantee that when we run the numerical simulation we
are varying (a) the size of one of the groups (Females), whereas maintaining the
other fixed in size (1,000 Males), but also (b) the percentage of active messengers
in each group. For the results presented here, we repeated each simulation 50
times.
Systematically, we study three cases:
– Case 1. In which all Males are always active (β = 1) and we vary the number
of active Females (α ∈ [0, 1])
– Case 2. In which active messengers probabilities percentages add to 1, so
that Males (β ∈ [0, 1]) and Females (α = 1− β)
– Case 3. In which all Females are always active (α = 1) and we vary the
number of active Males (β ∈ [0, 1])
The code repository (in python) is available at GitHub.com/BAFurtado/HISMP,
3 Results and Discussion
In this section we discuss the results of the three cases which aim at covering the
range of possible probability percentage of active members from both groups:
Males and Females.
3.1 Special Cases: extremes
First and foremost, we discuss the extreme cases. Those in which either the
parameters is zero, or the case when their probability is the same (Fig. 1).
The interesting result is that the energy of each of the groups through the
variation in size of Females is very similar when all Males are active (and no
Females), in the opposite case, and when both Males and Females are active.
Note that Fig. 1 (c) is the replication of the results obtained in [9].
The slight change happens when Males are active and the groups are of the
same size, Males have lower energy. Being the opposite when Females are active.
When half of the population of each group is active messengers (Fig. 1 (c)),
the results suggest that on average both groups are worth off when comparing
to the other three cases shown. This seems to be relevant as it indicates that
more active individual-seeking behavior results in lower than socially optimal
benefits.
3.2 Case 1: males are always active: β = 1, α = [0, 1]
The results of Case 1 (Fig. 2) are also of interest because it clearly shows
that active messaging from the Females group actually interferes only with the
(a) α = 1, β = 1 (b) α = 1, β = 0
(c) α = 0, β = 1 (d) α = .5, β = .5
Fig. 1. This figure shows the extreme cases in which α and β are 1 or 0 and when they
are both .5.
energy (satisfaction) of those on the other group. Further, the slightest of the
percentage of Females that are active (.1) results in the highest disturbance and
loss of energy in the group of Males. That suggests that a minimum parcel of
the opposite group becomes active in the matching game, large interference it
imposes in the general equilibrium.
3.3 Case 2: active agents vary: β = [0, 1], α = 1− β
This case probably represents the most likely real-case scenario. What Fig. 3
depicts is that stability is far from socially optimal (as observed in Fig. 1) and
that the group with the highest percentage is less successful in bringing their
energy to better level when compared to the other group. Thus, Females show
their best results when they have the least percentage (.1), compared to Males
at .9. The opposite happens when Feales have their highest percentage of active
members (.9) and Males have their smallest (.1).
(a) α = .1, β = 1 (b) α = .4, β = 1
(c) α = .6, β = 1 (d) α = .9, β = 1
Fig. 2. This figure shows Case 1 when males are always active: β = 1, α = [0, 1]
3.4 Case 3: females are always active: β = [0, 1], α = 1
In Case 3 (Fig. 4), similarly to what happens in Case 1, only Female energy is
affected when we change the probability of Male active messengers and keep all
Females as active. The best results for Females happens when Males approach
the full probability of becoming active. On the other hand, Females energy is
more deeply disturbed when just a fraction (.1) of Males are active.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we further generalize the SMP problem varying the size of the
matching groups, as in [9], but also further changing the probability of active
messengers in each group.
Results suggest that early, optimal results of the SMP remain strongly valid
for the three cases in which all members of both groups are active or members
of just one group is active. Real applications, however, are much more likely to
encounter situations in which there are members in both groups that actively
(a) α = .1, β = .9 (b) α = .4, β = .6
(c) α = .6, β = .4 (d) α = .9, β = .1
Fig. 3. This figure shows Case 2 when active agents vary: β = [0, 1], α = 1− β
seed to propose (engage) with members of the other group. In such cases, as
observed in Case 2, results are also stable, but definitely less socially optimal
when compared to just one group active cases.
Although, theoretically, when can correctly argue that active members are in
essence the same, their percentage presence in each group may vary. Hence, the
fact of belonging to a given group and having the members of the other group
as targets for matching is relevant.
Future work may propose to further generalize the problem in which a portion
of each group may try to seek matching within their own group.
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(a) α = 1, β = .1 (b) α = 1, β = .4
(c) α = 1, β = .6 (d) α = 1, β = .9
Fig. 4. This figure shows Case 3 females are always active: β = [0, 1], α = 1
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